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Abstract
In this paper we study the impact of misreported treatment status on the estimation of
causal treatment e®ects. We characterise the bias introduced by misclassi¯cation on the
average treatment e®ect on the treated under the assumption of selection on observables.
Although the bias of matching-type estimators computed from misclassi¯ed data cannot in
general be signed, we show that the bias is most likely to be downward if misclassi¯cation
does not depend on variables entering the selection-on-observables assumption, or only
depends on such variables via the propensity score index. We extend the framework to
multiple treatments. We provide results to bound the returns to a number of educational
quali¯cations in the UK semi-parametrically, and by using the unique nature of our data
we assess the plausibility for the two biases from measurement error and from omitted
variables to cancel out.
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11 Introduction
Countless theoretical and applied work has addressed itself to the evaluation problem, that is
to the measurement of the causal impact of a generic `treatment' on one or more outcomes of
interest (for a review see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, and Imbens, 2004). Especially in
applied work, interest mostly lies in recovering the average e®ect of the treatment on the sub-
population of participants - the average treatment e®ect on the treated (ATT in the following).
While endogeneity of treatment status has been the main preoccupation of both theoretical
and empirical research, measurement error in recorded treatment status and its consequences
for the estimation of causal e®ects has received far less attention (Molinari, 2004, Lewbel,
2005, and Mahajan, 2006, are the only examples we are aware of). However, in empirical
applications the possibility of misrecorded treatment status is far from negligible. Examples
include the returns to work-related training, where the occurrence of training is typically self-
reported by individuals who are asked to recall whether they have undertaken any course
for work purposes; the e®ects of programmes (or policy schemes) in which participation (or
eligibility) is not recorded in administrative data and the treatment status is obtained from
survey respondents, who have been typically shown to have rather poor recall or awareness
of the kind of schemes they are in; the e®ects of government schemes where the researcher
cannot directly observe or measure actual take-up and has to `impute' the treatment status
(e.g. eligibility to some means-tested bene¯ts); or a randomised study where the extent of
actual compliance (in terms of participants failing to take the treatment and/or controls taking
an alternative one) is not recorded in the data. A more general class of example applications
comprises those situations in which the treatment status is derived by splitting the sample
based on an underlying continuous variable which is itself potentially measured with error (e.g.
income or consumption to de¯ne poverty status, or ¯rm size to de¯ne some form of eligibility).
Since the treatment indicator is a binary or categorical variable, any measurement error
will by construction vary with the true treatment status (e.g. Aigner, 1973, or Card, 1996).
In the presence of such non-classical errors, OLS estimates are biased, though not necessarily
downward, and so would standard IV (e.g. Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001).1
1By contrast, if it were a continuous variable to be a®ected by measurement error, standard results show
that OLS estimates would be downward biased, while appropriate IV methods applied to the linear regression
model would provide consistent estimates.
2In this paper we study the impact of misreported treatment status on the estimation of
causal treatment e®ects. In particular, we characterise the bias introduced by misclassi¯cation
on the ATT under the assumption of selection on observables, and derive results for partial
identi¯cation that do not rely on additional information (e.g. multiple measures or instrument-
like variables) and that can be implemented in a non/semi-parametric fashion. We further
extend the framework to multiple treatments.
The causal e®ects that motivated this paper are the wage returns to educational quali¯ca-
tions in the UK. While the estimation of the return to education is amongst the most explored
and proli¯c areas in labour economics and attracts constant policy interest (for a discussion, see
Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, 2004), there is a real possibility of errors in education data: in
addition to data transcript errors, survey respondents may either over-report their attainment,
simply not remember, or just not know if the schooling they have had counts as a quali¯ca-
tion. As to the latter in particular, the British education system is remarkably complex, with a
plethora of di®erent - and changing - sub-quali¯cations classi¯ed in broader levels, often based
on obtained grades.
The received wisdom from the studies on the returns to years of education has traditionally
been that the upward bias from omitted `ability' variables and the downward bias from (clas-
sical) measurement error largely cancel each other out (for a review see in particular Griliches,
1977, and Card, 1999; for a recent UK study see Bonjour et al., 2003). Such a continuous
years-of-schooling measure, although particularly convenient, imposes the restriction that the
returns increase linearly with each additional year, irrespective of the level and type of educa-
tional quali¯cations the years refer to. In the UK and other European countries, however, there
are alternative nationally-based routes leading to quite di®erent educational quali¯cations, and
the importance of distinguishing between di®erent types of quali¯cations and allowing each to
have a separate e®ect on earnings is widely accepted (see the discussion in Blundell, Dearden
and Sianesi, 2005). With a categorical quali¯cation-based measure of education, however, as
mentioned above the assumption of classical measurement error cannot hold, as individuals
in the lowest category can never under-report their education level and individuals in the top
category cannot over-report. Given that OLS estimates are not necessarily downward biased,
the cancelling out of the ability and measurement error biases cannot be expected to hold in
general. Moreover, the IV methodology cannot provide consistent estimates of the returns to
3quali¯cations.
To date, empirical evidence on the importance of these issues for the estimation of returns
to education is restricted to the US, where it was in fact shown that measurement error might
play a non-negligible role, as we review in the section below. For the UK there are no estimates
of the returns to educational quali¯cations that adequately correct for measurement error.
This is of great concern, in view of the stronger emphasis on returns to discrete levels of
educational quali¯cations in the UK and given the widespread belief amongst UK researchers
and policymakers that ability and measurement error biases still cancel out (Dearden, 1999b,
Dearden et al., 2002, and McIntosh, 2004).
When an instrument-like variable, or an additional, independent measure of the treatment
of interest becomes available, point identi¯cation of returns can be achieved (Lewbel, 2005, and
Mahajan, 2006). In our companion paper (Battistin and Sianesi, 2006) we exploit the charac-
terisation of the bias developed in this paper together with repeated measurements of individual
educational quali¯cations to arrive at point estimates of the returns to educational quali¯cations
that allow for measurement error. However, multiple measures are far from being the norm in
practical applications; this paper thus suggests a bounding approach and corresponding sensi-
tivity analysis that while easy to implement can provide an often quite informative robustness
check. In most instances, restrictions on the nature of reporting errors can be obtained by
looking at results from previous research and/or behavioural theories that seem reasonable for
the phenomenon under investigation; alternatively, bounds can be calculated for a range of
plausible values of reporting errors to assess the robustness of the evaluation inference to the
presence of misclassi¯cation.
This paper provides a number of new contributions of considerable policy and practical
relevance, as well as of more general methodological interest. We start by characterising the
bias introduced by misclassi¯cation on the average treatment e®ect on the treated under the
assumption of selection on observables (or conditional independence). To the best of our knowl-
edge, all papers dealing with this issue only consider the treatment e®ect for a given value of the
observable characteristics. Although the resulting bias of matching-type estimators computed
from misclassi¯ed data cannot in general be signed, we show that the bias is most likely to be
downward if misclassi¯cation does not depend on variables entering the selection-on-observables
assumption, or if misclassi¯cation only depends on such variables via the propensity score index.
4We further extend our approach to a multiple-treatment framework, which becomes neces-
sary if interest lies in estimating the incremental impacts of multiple treatments and in fact
the impacts of binary but more narrowly-de¯ned treatments that do not split up the entire
population. In either of such cases, account needs to be taken of the potential misclassi¯cation
in the reporting of all treatment levels, not just in the two ones being considered. Further-
more, as we argue in more detail in Section 6, the move to a multiple treatment framework
is often necessary just to be able to justify the non-di®erential misclassi¯cation assumption
widely invoked in the literature (see Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001).
The characterisation of the bias we provide straightforwardly suggests the derivation of
bounds for the ATT(s) by making a priori assumptions on the extent of misclassi¯cation. Such
bounds can be derived by exploiting the observed propensity score in a non/semi-parametric
way, in particular allowing for arbitrarily heterogeneous individual returns, for arbitrary non-
linearities in the no-treatment outcome equation and for misreporting probabilities to depend
on individual characteristics, albeit only through the propensity score.
In our empirical application we implement this approach and provide bounds to the returns
to a number of educational quali¯cations in the UK, both in a binary and multiple-treatment
setting. To motivate the conditional independence assumption we rely on Blundell, Dearden
and Sianesi (2005) who could not ¯nd any strong evidence of remaining selection bias given the
information available in that data.
Further, by using the uniquely rich National Child Development Survey (NCDS) data we
assess the plausibility that the biases from measurement error and from omitted variables cancel
out in the estimation of returns in the UK. If this were the case, to estimate up-to-date returns
to quali¯cations policy-makers could simply rely on Labour Force Survey-type datasets, which
totally rely on recall about individuals' and do not contain any information on individual ability
and family background.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, in Section 2 we start by reviewing
the evidence on measurement error and returns to educational quali¯cations. Section 3 sets out
the general evaluation framework, while Section 4 introduces the possibility of misclassi¯cation
in the treatment status. In Section 5 we show the consequences that such reporting errors
might have for the estimation of causal treatment e®ects. In Section 6 we discuss how to
extend our identi¯cation strategy to deal with misreporting of categorical treatments. Section
57 discusses how information in the NCDS will allow us to implement this strategy under fairly
weak assumptions on the nature of the data collected, and de¯nes our parameters of interest.
In Section 8 we ¯rst sketch our strategy for partial identi¯cation of causal e®ects in the presence
of misclassi¯cation, before presenting and discussing our results. Section 9 concludes.
2 The evidence so far
Whilst use of years of completed education has a long history in the US, for the UK most
authors prefer quali¯cation-based measures of educational attainment. Recent examples include
Robinson (1997), Dearden (1999a,b), Blundell et al. (2000), Gosling, Machin and Meghir
(2000), Conlon (2001), Blanden et al. (2002), Dearden et al. (2002), Galindo-Rueda and
Vignoles (2003), McIntosh (2004) and Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi (2005).2
However despite the importance of schooling both as an outcome and as an explanatory
variable, hardly any e®ort has been devoted to assessing either the accuracy of widely used
survey reports of educational attainment in the UK, or the impact that misreporting might
have on estimated returns to education.3 To date, the only work in the latter direction is
Dearden (1999b) and Dearden et al. (2000 and 2002), who however ignore the non-classical
nature of measurement error caused by misreporting of discrete quali¯cations and conclude
that measurement error bias and omitted ability bias largely cancel out in the estimation of
returns. Indeed, some recent work based on the UK Labour Force Survey (e.g. McIntosh, 2004)
at times appeals to this result.
As a starting point and a benchmark it is thus worth considering the evidence on categorical
education measures available for the US, most of which being provided by the study by Kane,
Rouse and Staiger (1999) (see also the work referred to by Card, 1999). Overall, misreporting
was found to be more likely to happen for low levels of quali¯cation, with over-reporting being
more likely than under-reporting (see also Black, Sanders and Taylor, 2003) and events such
as degree completion being more accurately reported than completed years of college. Inter-
estingly, transcript measures were often found to be subject to at least as much { and at times
even more! { measurement error as self-reported survey measures.
2For a review and summary of some recent work on returns to quali¯cations, see Sianesi (2003).
3Ives (1984) only o®ers a descriptive study of the mismatch between self-reported and administrative infor-
mation on quali¯cations in the NCDS, ¯nding serious discrepancies particularly for the lower-level academic
quali¯cations.
6With regard to their more speci¯c ¯ndings, extensive measurement error was found in self-
reported measures for those completing less than 12 years of schooling (i.e. the high-school
drop-outs). As to bachelor's degree attainment, they found that 95 percent of those with a
degree reported so accurately and less than 1 percent of those without a degree misreported
having one, with self-reported information being actually more accurate than information from
administrative data. As to years of college completed, however, both measures were found
to be often inaccurate. In particular, 6 percent of those with no completed years of college
misreported to have completed some, and 6 percent of those who had completed some college
misreported to have completed none. Estimates of returns that ignore such misclassi¯cation
were found to be severely biased, either upwards or downwards depending on the educational
level of interest. Similarly, the application in Lewbel (2005) points to seriously inaccurate
transcript information as to degree attainment and ¯nds that allowing for misclassi¯cation has
a considerable impact on estimated returns to college, leading to around a 5-fold increase in
the return to a degree.
3 The evaluation set-up
3.1 Potential outcomes framework
The measurement of the causal impact of a generic `treatment' can be fruitfully framed within
the potential outcome framework.4 In the next section we extend such a framework to study the
consequences for the identi¯cation of causal e®ects of allowing measurement error in recorded
treatment status. The speci¯c evaluation problem we have in mind is the measurement of the
returns to educational quali¯cations { that is of the causal e®ects of quali¯cations on individual
(log) wages in the population of interest { when measurement error a®ects the reporting of
education.
To ease the exposition we start by considering the binary treatment setting, with treatment
de¯ned by having achieved an educational outcome or not, denoted by D¤ = 1 and D¤ = 0. Ex-
amples include completing college compared to not doing so, or attaining any quali¯cation com-
pared to dropping out of high-school with none. The generalization to the multiple-treatment
4For reviews of the evaluation problem see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and Imbens (2004). For
the potential outcome framework, the main references are Fisher (1935), Neyman (1935), Roy (1951), Quandt
(1972) and Rubin (1974).
7case, though notationally more demanding, proceeds along the same lines and will be consid-
ered in Section 6. To ease the comparison with the general evaluation literature, we will often
refer to individuals with D¤ = 1 as the group of `participants' (in the educational quali¯cation
of interest) and to those with D¤ = 0 as the group of `non-participants'.
Letting Y1 be the wage if the individual were to achieve the quali¯cation of interest and
Y0 the wage if the individual were not to achieve the quali¯cation, the individual causal e®ect
(or return) of achieving the quali¯cation is de¯ned as the di®erence between the two potential
outcomes, Y1¡Y0. The observed individual wage can then be written as Y = Y0+D¤(Y1¡Y0),
with Y = Y1 if the individual is a participant and Y = Y0 if the individual is a non-participant.
This set-up is extremely general, in particular it does not assume that the returns to a given
quali¯cation are homogeneous across individuals.5
Since no individual can be in two di®erent educational states at the same time, either Y1
or Y0 is missing, which makes it impossible to ever observe the individual return. A more
modest though still challenging aim is to identify the average return in some population of
interest. The group which has traditionally received most attention in the evaluation literature
is the group of treated. In our case, the average e®ect of treatment on the treated (ATT)
represents the average return to education for those individuals who have chosen to undertake
the quali¯cation of interest:
¢
¤ ´ E(Y1 ¡ Y0jD
¤ = 1) = E(Y1jD
¤ = 1) ¡ E(Y0jD
¤ = 1): (1)
This is the parameter of interest when the `treatment' is voluntary, and is the one needed for a
cost-bene¯t analysis. Given that achievement of (post-compulsory) educational quali¯cations is
voluntary, in this paper we shall focus on the ATT, capturing the average payo® to individuals'
own educational choices.6
5Note however that for this representation to be meaningful, the stable unit-treatment value assumption
needs to be satis¯ed (Rubin, 1980), requiring that an individual's potential outcomes as well as the chosen
education level are independent from the schooling choices of other individuals in the population.
6An additional reason to focus on this parameter relates to the relative ease of its identi¯cation. Identi¯cation
of the average e®ect of treatment on the non-treated, or of the average treatment e®ect requires more restrictive
assumptions, and was in fact found to be too demanding on the data we use (see Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi,
2005).
83.2 Identi¯cation in the absence of misclassi¯cation
As to the identi¯cation of the ATT, the ¯rst term in (1) is observed, since E(Y1jD¤ = 1) =
E(Y jD¤ = 1) for individuals acquiring the quali¯cation. The average unobserved counterfactual
E(Y0jD¤ = 1) needs however to be somehow constructed on the basis of some usually untestable
identifying assumptions.
As we aim to characterize the impact of measurement error in the reporting of D¤, in what
follows we will assume that the outcome-relevant di®erences in the composition of participants
and non-participants can purely be attributed to observable characteristics (selection on ob-
servables or conditional independence assumption), or, in other words, that D¤ is exogenous
given X:
Assumption 1 (Conditional Independence Assumption) Conditional on a set of observ-




This assumption requires the evaluator to observe all those characteristics that jointly a®ect
the decision to acquire the quali¯cation of interest and potential wages in the absence of that
educational investment. Its plausibility for our empirical application, and in particular the issue
of `ability bias', will be addressed in the data section.
To give empirical content to Assumption 1, we also require the following condition on the
support of the X variables:




¤ = 1jX = x) < 1; 8x
where e¤(x) is the propensity score.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the causal e®ect of education for those who participated in






¤ = 1)dx; (2)
9where
¢
¤(x) ´ E(Y1 ¡ Y0jx) = E(Y jD
¤ = 1;x) ¡ E(Y jD
¤ = 0;x)
is the conditional treatment e®ect, that is the average treatment e®ect (or average return) for
individuals with characteristics X = x. Note that, because of Assumption 2, the conditional
e®ect is well de¯ned for all values X in the population. This e®ect is integrated with respect
to the distribution of X for participants.7
4 Misclassi¯ed treatment status
4.1 General formulation of the problem
Either because individuals are left to self-report their quali¯cations or because of transript
errors, the treatment status D which is recorded in the data may di®er from the actual status
D¤. By analogy to the de¯nition of D¤, let D = 1 be the group of individuals who self-report
to have attained the educational quali¯cation of interest, and D = 0 the group of individuals
reporting not to have attained it.
In the absence of measurement error, data are informative about (Y;D¤;X); as seen above,
estimators based on Assumptions 1 and 2 establish a correspondence between this triple and
the parameter of interest in (1). By contrast when quali¯cations are misreported, data are
informative about the distribution of measurement-error contaminated variables. If measure-
ment error is ignored, or not perceived, causal e®ects will thus be inferred using realizations of
(Y;D;X) as if they were realizations of (Y;D¤;X), and analogue estimators of (2) will therefore
be constructed from (Y;D;X).
In particular, the object that can be computed from the observed data is:
Z
S
¢(x)f(xjD = 1)dx ´ ¢; (3)
where:
¢(x) ´ E(Y jD = 1;x) ¡ E(Y jD = 0;x);
S ´ fx : 0 < e(x) ´ Pr(D = 1jX = x) < 1g:
7In its bare essentials, estimation proceeds by considering the empirical analogues of the quantities on
the right-hand-side of (2). In particular one can perform any type of semi/non-parametric estimation of the
conditional expectation function in the non-participation group, E(Y jD¤ = 0;x), and then average it over
the distribution of X in the participants' group (within the common support). One way of implementing this
non-parametric regression is via matching methods (see Imbens, 2004, for a review).
10Hence S is the observed common support for the self-reported participants in education and
e(x) is the propensity score calculated from the mismeasured quali¯cation D. It is worth noting
that, as we will discuss further below, although Assumption 2 implies that the true score e¤(x)
is strictly between zero and one, misclassi¯cation can cause the observed score e(x) to take on
values at the boundaries. It is also worth noting that estimators of the ATT based on e(x) (e.g.
estimators based on propensity score matching or re-weighting) are equivalent to the estimator




¢[e(x)]f[e(x)jD = 1]de: (4)
The result straightforwardly follows from x being ¯ner than e(x) and by the balancing property
of the propensity scores (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
Since some individuals with D¤ = 0 will erroneously be misclassi¯ed as participants on the
basis of the error-a®ected indicator D and only part of those individuals reporting D = 1 have
actually got the quali¯cation of interest, the estimation of causal e®ects based on (Y;D;X) will
in general be biased for treatment e®ects, with the magnitude of this bias depending on the
extent of misclassi¯cation. This is shown in Section 5.3, where we derive the di®erence between
the causal parameter of interest that would consistently be estimated if we observed the correct
triple (Y;D¤;X) and the parameter that would instead be estimated from the observable triple
(Y;D;X) { namely ¢.
4.2 The misclassi¯cation probabilities
In what follows we build on Molinari (2004) to introduce the notation required to study this
problem, as well as the assumption on the classi¯cation errors we will maintain throughout
(Assumption 3). We start by de¯ning the (mis)classi¯cation probabilities as
¸ij(x) ´ Pr(D
¤ = ijD = j;x); i;j 2 f0;1g;
which may in general depend on X. In the binary case, there are two types of misclassi¯cation:
¸10(x), the proportion of true participants amongst those reporting D = 0; and ¸01(x), the
proportion of true non-participants amongst those with D = 1.
Of recurrent use will be the probabilities of exact classi¯cation:
¸00(x) ´ ¸0(x) = Pr(D
¤ = 0jD = 0;x);
¸11(x) ´ ¸1(x) = Pr(D
¤ = 1jD = 0;x);
11where for ease of notation only one subscript is retained.8 It is convenient to collect the
(mis)classi¯cation probabilities into the matrix of (mis)classi¯cation probabilities:
¦(x) =
·
¸0(x) 1 ¡ ¸0(x)
1 ¡ ¸1(x) ¸1(x)
¸
:
Throughout our discussion, we will assume that the classi¯cation error is non-di®erential,
as this can help us write down relatively detailed but still manageable models (see Bound,
Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001). Accordingly, we will maintain the assumption that, conditional
on a person's actual quali¯cation and on other covariates, reporting errors are independent of
earnings.
Assumption 3 (Non-Di®erential Misclassi¯cation given X) Any variable D which
proxies D¤ does not contain information to predict the outcome of interest Y conditional on D¤
and X:
E(Y jD
¤;D;X) = E(Y jD
¤;X):
For the binary treatment case, this amounts to the following two conditions:
(a) E(Y0jD
¤ = 0;D = 1;X) = E(Y0jD
¤ = 0;D = 0;X);
(b) E(Y1jD
¤ = 1;D = 1;X) = E(Y1jD
¤ = 1;D = 0;X):
These two conditions highlight how this assumption would not hold if an individual's propen-
sity to misreport treatment status is related to outcomes. In particular, note that (b) is implied
by:
E(Y0jD
¤ = 1;D = 1;X) = E(Y0jD
¤ = 1;D = 0;X)
and
E(Y1 ¡ Y0jD
¤ = 1;D = 1;X) = E(Y1 ¡ Y0jD
¤ = 1;D = 0;X):
Thus Assumption 3 would be violated if those graduates (D¤ = 1) who experience a very
low Y1 - either because they have received a negative productivity shock to their no-education
earnings and/or because they have reaped a very low if not negative return from their degree
- are more inclined to deny possessing the quali¯cation. In addition to such type of behaviour
by respondents, there is a more technical consideration that would in fact guarantee a violation
8The (mis)classi¯cation probabilities can also be de¯ned conditional on the true treatment status: °1 =
Pr(D = 1jD¤ = 1) and °0 = Pr(D = 0jD¤ = 0). These °'s are linked to our ¸'s via Bayes' Theorem.
12of this assumption. If in de¯ning the treatment indicator one were to ignore a feature of the
treatment that a®ects both its e®ect and recall precision, Assumption 3 would by construction
break down. The obvious solution to this is to re¯ne the treatment to fully re°ect the feature
causing the violation, thus extending the framework to look at the treatment components
separately. We further elaborate on this issue in Section 6, where we turn to multiple treatments.
Under Assumption 3, individuals for whom we observe D = d are a mixture of participants
(D¤ = 1) and non participants (D¤ = 0), with mixing weights given by the (mis)classi¯cation
probabilities. This result can be written compactly in matrix algebra notation as
·
E(Y jD = 0;x)




E(Y jD¤ = 0;x)
E(Y jD¤ = 1;x)
¸
;




E(Y jD = 0;x)




E(Y jD¤ = 0;x)
E(Y jD¤ = 1;x)
¸
: (5)
provided that det[¦(x)] = ¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1 6= 0. We formalise this condition as:
Assumption 4 (Informative Recorded Treatment Status) Misclassi¯cation is such that
¸1(x) + ¸0(x) ¡ 1 6= 0;
namely
Pr(D
¤ = 1jD = 1;X) 6= Pr(D
¤ = 1jD = 0;X)
for all values X.
Assumption 4 appears reasonable. It requires that conditional on X, the proportion of true
graduates among those who self-report having a degree be di®erent from the proportion of true
graduates among those who self-report not having a degree; or in other words, that the marginal
e®ect of recorded status D on true status D¤ conditional on X is non-zero. Assumption 4 only
requires inequality; it is however convenient to spell out here the two possible cases:
4-(a) ¸1(x) + ¸0(x) > 1 , Pr(D
¤ = 1jD = 1;X) > Pr(D
¤ = 1jD = 0;X);
4-(b) ¸1(x) + ¸0(x) < 1 , Pr(D
¤ = 1jD = 1;X) < Pr(D
¤ = 1jD = 0;X):
Case 4-(b) represents a case of such extensive misclassi¯cation for it to be more likely
to randomly draw a true graduate from the group reporting no degree than from the group
13reporting a degree. By contrast, case 4-(a) is a situation of limited misclassi¯cation in the
sense that, given X, the proportion of true graduates among those reporting to have a degree is
higher than the proportion of true graduates among those reporting not to have a degree. This
represents the most likely case, and is also implied by the assumption that observations on D
are more accurate than pure guesses once X is corrected for, i.e. ¸1(x) > 0:5 and ¸0(x) > 0:5
(see e.g. Bollinger, 1996).9
5 The bias introduced by misclassi¯cation
5.1 Bias on the conditional treatment e®ect
In deriving how the parameter that can be recovered from the observed data (3) compares
to the causal parameter of interest (2), we start by considering the bias introduced in the
estimation of the causal treatment e®ect conditional on X, that is on ¢¤(x). This bias can be
straightforwardly characterized using (5). The result in (6) coincides with the result in Lewbel
(2005), and more in general follows from Aigner (1973). The proof is reported in the Appendix.





¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1
: (6)
Accordingly, the estimates of ¢¤(x) based on the triple (Y;D;X) are always biased towards
zero, but possibly with the opposite sign if the measurement error is very strong (the denomina-
tor being negative in case 4-(b)). In terms of the conditional treatment e®ect, therefore, an at-
tenuation bias result still holds. An interesting implication of (6) is that ¢(x) = 0 , ¢¤(x) = 0,
so that the raw di®erence in observed outcomes given X being zero actually implies that
the true conditional treatment e®ect is zero. Finally, if there is no misclassi¯cation (that is,
¸0(x) = ¸1(x) = 1), then of course ¢(x) = ¢¤(x); and if there is complete reversal in the
classi¯cation (that is, ¸0(x) = ¸1(x) = 0), then ¢(x) = ¡¢¤(x).
9Another way to look at this is to note that Cov(D;D¤jx) = (¸1(x) + ¸0(x) ¡ 1)V ar(Djx). Hence the sign
of ¸1(x) + ¸0(x) ¡ 1 determines the sign of the correlation between D and D¤. Case 4-(a) can then be seen as
preventing measurement error to be so severe as to reverse the (positive) correlation between the observed and
the true treatment measures.
145.2 Support condition
We have thus far de¯ned the bias for the treatment e®ect conditional on a given value of
the vector X. In order to characterize the bias for the ATT, we have to integrate over the
distribution of X in the treated group, which brings us to discuss support issues. As we
pointed out earlier in this paper, although Assumption 2 ensures that at each point in the
support of the X distribution there are both individuals with D¤ = 1 and with D¤ = 0, the
extent of misclassi¯cation can be such that the same condition does not hold for individuals
with D = 1 and D = 0.
To see this, we use the law of iterated expectations to write e¤(x) in terms of e(x):
e
¤(x) = [1 ¡ ¸0(x)] + e(x)[¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1];
so that, solving for e(x) and using Assumption 4:
e(x) =
e¤(x) ¡ [1 ¡ ¸0(x)]
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1
:
from which we see that e(x) will take on values at the boundaries according to:
e(x) = 0 , ¸0(x) = 1 ¡ e
¤(x);
e(x) = 1 , ¸1(x) = e
¤(x):
It follows that the parameter (3) estimated from the triple (Y;D;X) could in general refer to
a di®erent population than the one implied by (Y;D¤;X).
To avoid this, we ensure that e(x) is strictly between 0 and 1 for all values of X by assuming:
Assumption 5 (Restriction on the extent of misclassi¯cation) Misclassi¯cation is
such that at each value X, at least one holds among




(the other one holding automatically given Assumption 4).
We make this assumption for formal convenience, in that it allows us to treat the common
support in the presence of measurement error as the true common support. If this were not
the case, the integrals in the following would be de¯ned over a di®erent subset of the truly
15treated. More speci¯cally, if Assumption 5 does not hold and we imposed common support
based on e(x), true participants not belonging to the observed S may be discarded so that the
ATT estimated from (Y;D;X) would refer to a di®erent population of participants than the
population of participants the true ATT refers to.
5.3 Bias on the treatment e®ect on the treated
If one were interested in the average treatment e®ect (ATE), that is the average return for an
individual irrespective of whether the quali¯cation of interest has been acquired or not:




the discussion could stop here.10 In particular, one would only need to integrate the conditional
average treatment e®ect ¢¤(x) over the distribution of X in the population, the latter being
observed in the data. Note also that the attenuation-bias result from Proposition 1 would keep
holding unconditional on X, so that ignoring measurement error in treatment status would lead
to a downward-biased estimate of the ATE. The correspondence between a zero raw average
e®ect and a zero true average e®ect, however, no longer holds, unless the misclassi¯cation
probabilities are assumed not to depend on X.
By contrast, if interest lies in recovering the average return to education for those who
invested in that quali¯cation (ATT), the conditional e®ect ¢¤(x) needs to be integrated over
the distribution of X in the (truly) treated group, f(xjD¤ = 1), which is not observed.11 The
following proposition provides a characterization of the bias introduced by measurement error
for the estimation of (1), that is the relationship between ¢¤ and ¢. The proof is reported in
the Appendix.
Proposition 2 (Bias on Treatment E®ects) If Assumptions 1 to 5 are satis¯ed, the rela-




!(x)¢(x)f(xjD = 1)dx; (7)
= ¢ +
Z
[!(x) ¡ 1]¢(x)f(xjD = 1)dx;
10Note that identi¯cation of ATE requires a strengthened Assumption 1, implying in particular homogeneous
returns (given X) or the absence of selection into education based on unobserved returns.
11By contrast, this distribution could be directly inferred if information on the true treatment status D¤ and













¤ = 1) =
Z
[1 ¡ ¸0(x)]f(x)dx +
Z
[¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1]e(x)f(x)dx:
This result shows that if the two ¸'s were known, the ATT could be estimated by appropri-
ately re-weighting the conditional di®erences in outcomes based on recorded treatment data,
¢(x), with weights de¯ned by !(x). Note that, as it should be, !(x) = 1 for all individuals if
there is no measurement error. Moreover, weights cannot be signed in general, implying that
¢¤ can be over- or under-estimated depending on the unknown probabilities ¸1(x) and ¸0(x).
A notable exception under limited mislcassi¯cation (4-(a)) is when the true incidence of treat-
ment in the population, P(D¤ = 1), is smaller than the one observed from raw data, P(D = 1).
This is a su±cient condition for ¢ to provide a downward-biased estimate of ¢¤, as all weights
would be larger than one. Although P(D¤ = 1) is in general unobserved, one could gauge the
relative size of the two probabilities if external validation data (e.g. government statistics on
educational attainment in our application) were available.
Furthermore, ¢ being zero no longer implies the absence of a treatment e®ect, as was the
case when conditioning on X.
Finally, it is worth noting that, because of (4), the result derived in Proposition 2 also
applies to the bias induced by misclassi¯cation when estimation is carried out with respect to
the observed propensity score e(x).
5.4 Special cases
In what follows we discuss two sets of restrictions that can be imposed on the probabilities
¸1(x) and ¸0(x) to sign the bias induced by misclassi¯cation.
Special Case 1 (Only over-reporting of quali¯cations) The misclassi¯cation probabili-
ties are such that only over-reporting can happen:
¸0(x) = 1
for all values X.
17To see why this condition represents a situation where only over-reporting of quali¯cations
can occur, note that it corresponds to P(D¤ = 1jD = 0) = 0, which rules out that true
graduates may be found among those reporting not to have a degree, in other words, ruling out
under-reporting. By setting ¸0(x) equal to one in (6) we get that the conditional treatment







e(x)f(xjD = 1)dx R
¸1(x)e(x)f(xjD = 1)dx
¸ 1
for all X, so that the estimated e®ect ¢ is always biased towards zero for ¢¤.12
Special Case 2 (Misclassi¯cation independent of X) The percentage of correct classi¯-
cation is independent of the characteristics X of respondents:
¸1(x) = ¸1 and ¸0(x) = ¸0
for all values X.
Although this assumption is clearly only made here for convenience, it could be weakened by
assuming constant probabilities within cells de¯ned by X. Alternatively, the same arguments
made below would still apply if one allowed misclassi¯cation to vary with X but only through
the propensity score index, e(X).







Pr(D=1) + (¸0 + ¸1 ¡ 1)
:
Under the likely scenario of limited misclassi¯cation (assumption (4)-a), all the weights are
positive and a ¯rst-order approximation to !(x) around (¸0 = 1;¸1 = 1) yields




1 ¡ Pr(D = 1)
Pr(D = 1)
];
from which it can be seen that a su±cient (and testable) condition for !(x) to be larger than
one is that the propensity score at x be smaller than the odds ratio, i.e. e(x) ·
Pr(D=1)
1¡Pr(D=1). From
12The assumption that individuals never under-report quali¯cations they have obtained can be weakened by
assuming that over-reporting is just more likely than under-reporting. This case of monotone misclassi¯cation
imposes that ¸1(x) < ¸0(x) for all values X, or, in a more intuitive form, P(D¤ = 0jD = 1) > P(D¤ = 1jD = 0).
Monotone misclassi¯cation re°ects the idea supported by cognitive studies that when respondents are asked
questions about socially and personally sensitive topics, they tend to under-report undesirable behaviours and
attitudes, and over-report desirable ones.
18a study of !(x) as a function of the ¸'s, it can be shown that only for values of the parameter
P(D = 1) smaller than 0:3 is there the possibility that, depending on the value of e(x), the
corresponding weight at x is positive but smaller than one. However we found that even in this
case the distribution of weights is skewed towards values (often much) larger than one, so that
in most empirical applications the `raw' estimate is most likely to be a lower bound.13
6 Extension to multiple treatments
So far we have considered treatments within the binary (single) treatment framework, and in
fact treatments where the speci¯c educational level of interest cuts right through the entire
educational spectrum (e.g. any quali¯cation versus none, or degree versus non-degree). This
does not of course rule out interest in the incremental returns to sequential multiple treatments,
or in the returns to binary treatments for a more narrowly de¯ned educational split, such as the
return to college vis-µ a-vis stopping with high school diploma, or the return to college vis-µ a-vis
dropping out from school without quali¯cations, or the return to ¯nishing school with some
quali¯cations vis-µ a-vis nothing.
It is important to note that even for considering such types of binary treatments, the analysis
needs to be extended to a multiple-treatment framework, since account needs to be taken of
the potential misclassi¯cation in the reporting of all educational levels, not just in the two
ones being considered. So for instance, even if one only wanted to compare college to high
school, the other categories would still need to be considered, since, ¯rst, individuals reporting
no quali¯cations might in reality have a high-school diploma or a college degree, and, second,
individuals reporting college or high school diploma might in reality have neither of the two
quali¯cations of interest.
In addition to the policy relevance of estimating returns to multiple educational quali¯ca-
tions and/or to more disaggregated ones, another important reason to turn to the multiple
treatment framework relates to the validity of the non-di®erential misclassi¯cation assumption.
As anticipated in Section 4, this assumption would by construction be violated if in de¯ning
the treatment indicator one were to lump across features of the treatment that a®ect both its
e®ect and the precision of its recall. To see this, consider the treatment being de¯ned as having
13More detailed results are available upon request.
19any quali¯cation as opposed to none.14 In such a situation, an individual with a degree will be
more likely both to correctly report to have any quali¯cation and to have higher earnings than
an observationally-equivalent individual who has only completed high school.
More generally, a need to consider an extended framework arises in any situation where
underlying the binary treatment indicator is a dose-response framework. In our application
we consider educational categories, which are inherently ordered and sequential, but such a
set-up can occur much more generally. For instance, when considering completion of college
for those who enrolled, or participation in a programme for the unemployed, the underlying
treatment { college or the programme { has itself a duration, which is likely to a®ect both recall
of the event and outcomes. Another example relates to treatments taken more or less recently;
recall is likely to depend on how long ago the treatment was received, and the treatment e®ects
themselves might evolve, in particular depreciate, over time.
Assumption 3 would thus appear to be most defensible when the treatment is disaggregated
into multiple treatments that fully embody the feature that if ignored would cause the violation
(sequential categories, duration, how long ago taken, etc.). In conclusion, extending the evalu-
ation framework to look at the treatment components/features as separate treatments not only
is often policy-relevant, but in the presence of misclassi¯cation it may often become a necessity
for justifying the widely invoked non-di®erential misclassi¯cation assumption.
With our educational application in mind, in the following we extend our framework to
consider three levels of quali¯cations (or more generally, of exposure), which we assume to be
of increasing intensity. Let these levels be de¯ned by D¤ = 0, D¤ = 1 and D¤ = 2, denoting,
for example, high-school drop-outs, high-school graduates and college graduates, respectively.
We are interested in the estimation of pairwise incremental returns, that is the wage return of
obtaining a quali¯cation of interest (e.g. college) relative to a lower quali¯cation (e.g. high-
school), when the only available measure of educational attainment D is potentially a®ected
by error. We focus on the following three ATT's:
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20 ´ E(Y2 ¡ Y0jD
¤ = 2):
14We thank Peter Mueser for pointing this out to us.




ij(x) = E(Y jD
¤ = i;x) ¡ E(Y jD
¤ = j;x);
¢ij(x) = E(Y jD = i;x) ¡ E(Y jD = j;x);




and ¢20(x) = ¢10(x)+¢21(x) hold by de¯nition. Along the lines of what discussed in Section
4, the relationship between true quantities and quantities observed from raw data depends on
the 3 £ 3 matrix of misclassi¯cation probabilities through the following expression:
0
@
E(Y jD = 0;x)
E(Y jD = 1;x)





E(Y jD¤ = 0;x)
E(Y jD¤ = 1;x)
E(Y jD¤ = 2;x)
1
A:
If this matrix is invertible, each ¢¤
ij(x) can be written as a function of the ¢ij(x)'s, thus
providing an extension of the result in Proposition 1.
































which depend on the conditional distributions of X given D¤ = 1 and D¤ = 2.
For the above quantities to have a causal interpretation we need suitably extended versions
of Assumptions 1 and 2 (see e.g. Imbens, 2000). Furthermore, to move to the unconditional
e®ects we need to invoke an extended version of Assumption 5. We combine all of these
Assumptions in:
Assumption 6 (Extended Conditional Independence, Common Support and Ex-
tent of Misclassi¯cation)
E(YjjD
¤ = i;X) = E(YjjD




¤ = ijX = x) < 1 i 2 f0;1g; 8x:
Moreover, misclassi¯cation is such that the observed common support coincides with the true
one for each pairwise comparison.
21Restrictions imposed on the misclassi¯cation probabilities can help simplify the relation-
ship between moments involving D¤ and moments involving D, and therefore the analytical
tractability of the problem. With our application in mind we thus impose a particular struc-
ture for the misclassi¯cation problem by assuming that misclassi¯cation can occur only for










which is a function of the four unknown probabilities (because of three adding up conditions):
¸00(x),¸11(x), ¸22(x) and ¸21(x). The following proposition extends Proposition 1 to the case
of multiple treatments. The proof is reported in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 (Bias on Treatment E®ects given X) Provided that the determinant of
¦(x) is di®erent from zero:
±(x) ´ ¸00(x)[¸22(x) ¡ ¸21(x)] ¡ ¸22(x)[1 ¡ ¸11(x) ¡ ¸21(x)] 6= 0













¸11(x) + ¸21(x) ¡ 1
±(x)
¢10(x) +






¸11(x) + ¸22(x) ¡ 1
±(x)
¢10(x) +
¸00(x) + ¸11(x) ¡ 1
±(x)
¢21(x):
A few comments are worth mentioning. The true conditional e®ects can be expressed as
weighted sums of the raw e®ects ¢10(x) and ¢21(x) (remember the adding up condition).
Weights are such that in the absence of misclassi¯cation raw e®ects coincide with true e®ects.
Most importantly, in sharp contrast to the binary treatment case (see Proposition 1), the e®ects
of misclassi¯cation on the relationship between ¢¤
ij(x) and ¢ij(x) is not easily pinned down;
depending on the extent and nature of misreporting across all categories, as well as on the
sign and magnitude of both ¢10(x) and ¢21(x), ¢ij(x) could be upward or downward biased
for ¢¤
ij(x). Nonetheless, by assuming that the mean response is monotonically increasing with
D¤ (which corresponds to assuming non-negative wage returns) and that the misclassi¯cation
error is non-di®erential, one can derive conditions on the extent of misclassi¯cation under which
22¢¤
ij(x) and ¢ij(x) have at least the same sign. We show in the Appendix that if ¸ii(x) > 0:5
for all i 2 f0;1;2g sign reversal is avoided.
The following proposition extends Proposition 2 to the case of multiple treatments.
Proposition 4 (Bias on Treatment E®ects) If Assumptions 3, 6 are satis¯ed and ¦(x)
has a non-zero determinant, the relationship between the true incremental ATT's and the e®ects





!1;ij(x)¢10(x)f(xjD = 1)dx +
Z
!2;ij(x)¢21(x)f(xjD = 2)dx;
where i > j and (i;j) 2 f0;1;2g, and !1;ij(x) and !2;ij(x) are de¯ned in the Appendix.
7 Data and educational quali¯cations of interest
7.1 Data
In this paper we only consider methods relying on Assumption 1, and we thus require very rich
background information capturing all those factors that jointly determine the attainment of
educational quali¯cations and wages. We use the uniquely rich data from the British National
Child Development Survey (NCDS), a detailed longitudinal cohort study of all children born
in a week in March 1958. There are extensive and commonly administered ability tests at
early ages (mathematics and reading ability at ages 7 and 11), as well as accurately measured
family background (parental education and social class) and school type variables, all ideal
for methods relying on the assumption of selection on observables. In fact, Blundell, Dearden
and Sianesi (2005) could not ¯nd evidence of remaining selection bias for the higher education
versus anything less decision once controlling for the same variables we use in this paper. We
thus invoke this conclusion in assuming that there are enough variables to be able to control
directly for selection. Our outcome is real gross hourly wages at age 33, and our measure of
educational quali¯cations is the one self-reported by respondents at age 33. Our sample of
3,642 is obtained by focusing on males only and restricting attention to those in work in 1991
with non-missing wage and education information.15
15Of the 5,606 males interviewed, the loss being mainly driven by non-response - less than 10% were not
currently in work.
237.2 Educational quali¯cations of interest
We start by brie°y outlining the educational system in Britain to put into context the edu-
cational quali¯cations to which we estimate the returns. Those students deciding to stay on
past the minimum school leaving age of 16 can either continue along an academic route or
else undertake a vocational quali¯cation before entering the labour market. Until 1986, pupils
choosing the former route could take Ordinary Levels (O level) at 16 and then possibly move
on to attain Advanced Levels (A levels) at the end of secondary school at 18. A levels still
represent the primary route into higher education (HE). The vocational path is much more
heterogeneous, from job-speci¯c, competence-based quali¯cations often delivered within a work
environment to more generic work-related quali¯cations. The academic and wide range of vo-
cational quali¯cations have been classi¯ed into equivalent National Vocational Quali¯cation
(NVQ) levels, ranging from level 1 to level 5.
The British system is thus quite distinct from the one in the US; nevertheless, forcing some
comparisons, one could regard the no-quali¯cations group as akin to the group of high-school
drop-outs, A levels to High School, and Higher Education to College.16
In our binary framework we consider the following two parameters in turn:
1. the return to achieving any academic quali¯cation compared to none17;
In the UK system, this translates into acquiring at least O levels compared to leaving
school at the minimum age of 16 without any formal quali¯cation, the counterfactual
being thus akin to high-school drop-out status in the US. This parameters re°ects a very
well de¯ned and homogenous quali¯cation, and it captures all the channels in which the
attainment of O levels can impact on wages later on in life, in particular the potential
contribution that attaining O levels may give to the attainment of A levels and then of
higher education. Additional policy relevance of the returns to O levels arises from the
¯nding that reforms raising the minimum school leaving age in the UK have impacted on
individuals achieving low academic quali¯cations, in particular O levels (Chevalier et al.,
2003, Del Bono and Galindo-Rueda, 2004).
16In such a comparison the group with O levels as highest quali¯cation is quite atypical, being made up of
individuals who stop at the minimum leaving age with formal quali¯cations.
17The `None' category also includes the level 1 academic quali¯cation Certi¯cates of Secondary Education
(CSE) at grade 2 to 5. (Students at 16 could take the lower-level CSE or the more academically demanding O
levels. The top grade (grade 1) achieved on a CSE was considered equivalent to an O level grade C. Most CSE
students tended to leave school at 16.)
242. the return from undertaking some form of higher education (HE) compared to any-
thing less. This considers both the academic route and its vocational equivalent (levels 4
and 5).
When we extend our framework to multiple treatments we consider incremental returns to
the following three broad and sequential education levels:
1. no quali¯cations (neither academic nor vocational);
This treatment level basically re°ects dropping out of school with no quali¯cations without
later undertaking any vocational studies or formally recognised practice.18
2. intermediate quali¯cations (level 2 { O levels or their vocational equivalent);
In addition to the academic O level exams held at age 16, this educational category
includes their level-2 vocational quali¯cations (e.g. intermediate City and Guilds and
Royal Society of Arts).
3. advanced quali¯cations (level 3 or above { at least A levels or their vocational equiv-
alent).
This collection of quali¯cations goes from high-school diploma (A levels) or level-3 vo-
cational quali¯cations (e.g. advanced City and Guilds and Royal Society of Arts, or
Ordinary National Diplomas, generally taken at age 16-18 and mostly in practical sub-
jects such as hairdressing, catering, building techniques, or computing), all the way up
to university and postgraduate studies or level-4 vocational (e.g. higher City and Guilds
and Royal Society of Arts, or Higher National Diplomas) and level-5 (professional degree)
quali¯cations.
Table 1 shows our sample split in our multiple treatment case, that is when we distinguish
between those who stopped education with no formal quali¯cation, those who stopped after
completing level 2, and those who stopped after completing at least level 3. Note that this
educational split encompasses academic school-based quali¯cations as well as their vocational
equivalents. Next, the table shows the sample split into our two binary treatments: HE versus
anything less, and any academic quali¯cation versus none.
18The `None' category also includes very low-level quali¯cations at NVQ level 1 or less, i.e. CSE grade 2 to
5 quali¯cations, other business quali¯cations, other quali¯cations not speci¯ed and Royal Society of Arts level
1 quali¯cations.
258 Partial identi¯cation of causal e®ects in the presence
of misclassi¯cation
8.1 Estimation issues
The aim of this section is to discuss how we derived estimates of the ATT for known values of
the misclassi¯cation probabilities and con¯dence intervals for the partially identi¯ed ATT. In
our empirical application we will implement the approach outlined in this section to provide
bounds to the returns to a number of educational quali¯cations in the UK. Such bounds can be
derived by exploiting the observed propensity score in a non/semi-parametric way, in particular
allowing for arbitrarily heterogeneous individual returns and leaving the no-treatment outcome
equation unspeci¯ed.19 Furthermore, both for the binary and the multiple treatment case,
we allow misreporting to depend on X, albeit only through the propensity score index. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the ¯rst ones to use the observed propensity score as a
solution to deal with the curse of dimensionality arising from all these sources. In fact, most
applications concerned with the estimation of the returns to educational attainment in the
presence of misreporting either ignore the presence of X (Black, Berger and Scott, 2000);
assume linearity, homogeneity in returns and misclassi¯cation independent of X (Kane, Rouse
and Staiger, 1999); or impose a parametric structure together with possibly doubtful restrictions
to ease estimation (Lewbel, 2005). The issue is further considered in our companion paper (see
Battistin and Sianesi, 2006b).
The idea is most simply put across by considering the case of binary treatments, though it
can be trivially extended to the case of multiple treatments. If the misclassi¯cation probabilities
are constant with respect to X, we have shown that the weights in Proposition 2 vary with X
only through the observed score e(x). By applying the law of iterated expectations to the term
on the right-hand-side of (7) we get
Ef!(x)¢(x)jD = 1g = Ef!(x)Ef¢(x)jD = 1;e(x)gjD = 1g;
= Ef!(x)¢[e(x)]jD = 1g; (9)
the last expression following since x is ¯ner than e(x) and from the observed propensity score
19Note that although both simple OLS regression and non-parametric methods such as matching rely on
Assumption 1, matching is not subject to several potential misspeci¯cation biases for the ATT. In particular,
OLS may su®er from misspeci¯cation bias for the no-treatment outcome equation; it may use this imposed
functional form to extrapolate outside the common support, if need be; and in the presence of heterogeneous
e®ects it does not in general identify the ATT (see Angrist, 1998, and Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, 2005).
26being a balancing score for the distribution of X for individuals with D = 1 and D = 0.
Known values of the probabilities of correct classi¯cation uniquely de¯ne the weights !(x), and
alternative estimators of the ATT result from considering the empirical analogue of (9). For
example, one could match individuals with D = 1 to individuals with D = 0 and then integrate
the outcome di®erence in the two groups weighted by !(x) with respect to the distribution of
the score for D = 1.
Note that semi-parametric estimation is also feasible if weights are constant within cells
de¯ned by the propensity score e(x) or, alternatively, if the misclassi¯cation probabilities are
left to vary with X through e(x). In this case we have
P(D
¤ = 1) = Ef1 ¡ ¸0[e(x)]g + Ef(¸0[e(x)] + ¸1[e(x)] ¡ 1)e(x)g
and weights in Proposition 2 can be used.
By using Proposition 2, bounds on the true ATT can be derived by taking the maximum
and the minimum value of the estimate of ¢¤ when the probabilities ¸0(x) and ¸1(x) vary over
the unit interval, or on a suitably chosen subset of [0;1] £ [0;1]. Indeed, leaving the misclas-
si¯cation probabilities to vary between zero and one is most likely to imply unreasonably high
misclassi¯cation rates for the problem under consideration. One possibility is to use a priori
restrictions on these probabilities derived from previous studies or from knowledge of the eco-
nomic context under investigation. For example, results from validation studies and behavioral
theories developed in the social sciences often suggest restrictions on misclassi¯cation. Some
fairly general restrictions that can be applied to the study of returns to education include the
three cases considered in Section 5.4.
In our application, we consider the empirical analogue of (9) by stratifying observations
on the value of the propensity score and by allowing the ¸'s be stratum speci¯c. Partial
identi¯cation of the relevant ATT is then obtained through Proposition 2 (in the binary case) or
Proposition 4 (in the multiple-treatment case) by considering the maximum and the minimum
values of the ¢¤'s over the set de¯ned by the sum of the exact classi¯cation probabilities
exceeding a given value and by imposing that overreporting is more likely than underreporting.
As to the implementation details for the binary case, we ¯rst account for the high di-
mensionality of X by using strati¯cation matching (see e.g Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) and
regression adjustment within each stratum.20 Speci¯cally, we stratify the sample on 5 values
20Given our relatively small sample size, we performed the latter to account for residual imbalance of X
27of the estimated propensity score. Within each stratum k we run a regression of the outcome
Y on e(x), separately for the D = 1 and D = 0 groups, and calculate the corresponding raw
conditional treatment e®ect ¢(ek) as the di®erence in predicted outcomes at the mean stratum
propensity score. We then specify a grid of step 0:05 between 0:5 and 1 for ¸0(x) and ¸1(x),
and consider only the 25 points that are consistent with the identi¯cation region de¯ned by
f¸1(x) + ¸0(x) ¸ 1:6)g \ f¸1(x) · ¸0(x)g, where the latter restriction re°ects overreport-
ing being more likely than underreporting (see Section 5.4). We thus end up with 255 possible
combinations of f¸1(x);¸0(x)g across strata. Finally, we compute the values of ¢¤ using Propo-
sition 2 for all admissibile combinations, and take the maximum and the minimum over the
sets de¯ned by ¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ k, where k 2 [1:6;2].
In the multiple treatment case, we deal with the high dimensionality of X by de¯ning strata
on the two scores e1(x) ´ P(D = 1jx) and e2(x) ´ P(D = 2jx). To ensure cells of reasonable
sample size, we stratify observations on 2 values of each score, thus obtaining 4 strata. We
again perform regression adjustment within each stratum to account for residual imbalance,
this time regressing Y on e1(x), e2(x) and e1(x) ¢ e2(x) separately for each subgroup de¯ned
by D. For given values of ¸22 and ¸21, we then construct a grid of step 0:25 between 0:5 and
1 for ¸00(x) and ¸11(x), and impose that ¸11(x) · 1 ¡ ¸21(x). This restriction is needed to
ensure that the resulting ¦(x) is indeed a probability matrix. Note that, as in the binary
case, the assumption we maintain that observations on (each value of) D are more accurate
than pure guesses, ¸ii(x) ¸ 0:5 for i = 0;1;2, implies that sign reversal is avoided and that
misclassi¯cation is limited, in the sense that the probability of picking someone who truly has
a given quali¯cation is higher when drawing randomly from the group that claims to have that
quali¯cation rather than from the group claiming to have a di®erent one. We ¯nally further
ensure that overreporting is more likely than underreporting, which in the multiple-treatment
case translates into the condition that ¸00(x) ¸ maxf¸11(x) + ¸21(x);¸22(x)g.21 We ¯nally
derive bounds on the incremental ATT's using Proposition 4 and by proceeding as in the
binary case.
A ¯nal issue concerns the signi¯cance of our estimates. A growing body of research in the
within stratum. Both in the case of any academic quali¯cation and HE we could reject joint balancing of the
observables at 10% for only one stratum.
21This translates into the assumption that all elements of ¦(x) above the diagonal are smaller than those
below.
28last years has looked into the problem of constructing con¯dence intervals for partially identi¯ed
parameters. In our application, we follow Horowitz and Manski (2000) and derive con¯dence
intervals for bounds that cover the entire identi¯cation region with 95 percent probability. By
denoting with ^ L and ^ U the lower and the upper bounds, respectively, we report con¯dence
intervals of the form [^ L ¡ ³; ^ U + ³], where ³ is a positive constant obtained by bootstrapping
the distribution of bounds so to ensure the required probability of coverage. As stated in Imbens
and Manski (2004; see Lemma 1), the probability that the interval considered covers the true
ATT is at least 95 percent (thus leading to conservative inference).
8.2 Results
8.2.1 Binary levels of attainment
The return ¢ from attaining any academic quali¯cation at 16 for those who chose to do so is
estimated at 23:4 percent in the raw data (using the full set of controls outlined in Section 7.1).
The average return to higher education for graduates is estimated at 23:1 percent (see Table
2).
We investigated the sensitivity of these estimates to the presence of misclassi¯cation by
performing several types of analyses. We ¯rst used Proposition 2 to bound the true returns ¢¤
by considering the case of misclassi¯cation independent of X when ¸0 and ¸1 are left to vary
between 70 percent (very severe misclassi¯cation) and 100 percent (exact reporting). The ¯rst
panel in Figure 1 plots how the value of the true return to any academic quali¯cation varies
as a function of the extent of misclassi¯cation. The minimum and the maximum values of the
true return are 23:4 percent and 55:7 percent and are achieved for ¸0 = 1 and ¸1 = 1 and
for ¸0 = 0:7 and ¸1 = 0:7. We thus ¯nd that, in line with our previous discussion, returns
estimated from raw data represent a lower bound for the true return. A similar result holds for
the return to higher education, for which the identi¯cation region corresponds to (23:1;60:1).
The second panel in Figure 1 considers the identifying power of assuming that over-reporting
is more likely than under-reporting. Such restriction embodies the ¯nding of cognitive studies
that respondents tend to over-report desirable features and behaviours. As we have pointed
out in Section 5.4, this corresponds to ¯nding the maximum and the minimum in the region
for which ¸0 ¸ ¸1. It is evident from the ¯gure that such a restriction on the nature of
misclassi¯cation does not help improve the identi¯cation power, as the lower and upper bounds
29coincide with those de¯ned from the unconstrained region.
A further sensible restriction that can be imposed to obtain tighter bounds is ¸0+¸1 ¸ k > 1
for increasing values of k. This corresponds to consider the intersection of the second panel
in Figure 1 with two-dimensional planes that increasingly shift to the right of the ¯gure for
higher values of k. We implemented this idea for the case of misclassi¯cation probabilities
dependent on x as described in the previous section. Table 2 reports the lower and upper
bounds for the return to attaining any academic quali¯cation and for the return to completing
higher education for a number of values of k. Each set of lower and upper bounds thus relates
to a di®erent value of the sum of the misclassi¯cation probabilities. The table also reports
the 95 percent con¯dence intervals for the identi¯cation region, which as mentioned lead to
conservative inference for the parameter of interest.
As expected, the bounds become more informative (narrower) as sum of ¸'s approaches 2.
An interesting result is that even when we allow for a non-negligible extent of misclassi¯cation
- up to 10 percent of individuals misreporting their attainment in either direction - the point
estimates of the lower and upper bounds for the returns are quite close (i.e. around 23-26
percent for both any academic quali¯cation and HE).
By using the uniquely rich NCDS data we can assess the plausibility that the biases from
measurement error and from omitted variables cancel out in the estimation of returns in the
UK. If this were the case, to estimate up-to-date returns to quali¯cations policy-makers could
simply rely on Labour Force Survey-type datasets, which totally rely on recall about individuals'
educational attainment and do not contain any information on individual ability and family
background.
To perform this exercise, we have estimated the return from the raw data controlling only
for the Labour Force Survey-style variables of gender, age, ethnicity and region (gender and
age implicitly via sample choice), ¢LFS. For academic quali¯cations, ¢LFS is 32:9 percent
and for HE 35:9 percent. As to returns to any academic quali¯cation, for the sum of the ¸'s
roughly larger than 1:8, ignoring both measurement error and ability biases yields an upper
bound. More generally, we ¯nd that there is a chance for the two biases to cancel out only
if measurement error is rather severe, in particular when at least 20 percent of individuals
misreport their quali¯cations in either direction. In fact, for the case where ¸0 + ¸1 ¸ 1:9,
which is in line with the little available evidence so far (see in particular Kane, Rouse and
30Staiger, 1999), even the conservative con¯dence intervals do not contain the point estimate of
¢LFS. As to the returns to HE, it is even harder to appeal to the cancelling of the two biases.22
We also derived the bounds for the case of constant ¸'s. As expected, they turned out to
be sharper; they however led to the same inferential conclusions about the true e®ect and its
relationship with ¢LFS.
8.2.2 Multiple levels of attainment
We now turn to a more disaggregated analysis in a multiple treatment framework that focuses
on the incremental returns to three broad education levels. We consider a sequence starting
with no (or extremely low-level) quali¯cations, O levels or vocational equivalent (\intermedi-
ate") quali¯cations and at least A levels or vocational equivalent (\advanced") quali¯cations.
Ignoring potential misclassi¯cation, the incremental ATT's to acquire intermediate quali¯ca-
tions is 10:6 percent, to move from intermediate to advanced quali¯cations is 18:4 percent, and
to acquire advanced quali¯cations compared to remaining with none is 28:3 percent.
As done for the binary case, we proceeded to assess the robustness of these estimates
to the presence of misclassi¯cation in recorded educational attainment. Starting with the
case of misclassi¯cation independent of X, we considered the bounds which arise when letting
the exact classi¯cation probabilities (¸00, ¸11 and ¸22) vary between 70 percent (very severe
misclassi¯cation) and 100 percent (exact classi¯cation), and the probability of `forgetting' their
advanced quali¯cations by those stating to have only intermediate ones (¸21) between 0 and 15
percent.
As was the case for our binary treatments, the ensuing identi¯cation regions are quite wide:
(5:8;27:1) for ¢¤
10, (11:3;33:0) for ¢¤
21, and (27:9;39:9) for ¢¤
20. In our multiple-treatment
application, imposing the restriction that over-reporting is more likely than underreporting
does however improve identi¯cation power, albeit only for ¢¤
10 (a 5:6 percentage reduction in
width by lowering the upper bound) and ¢¤
21 (a 14:1 percentage reduction by raising the lower
bound).
To gain some further insight we move to a graphical analysis. This is similar to what done for
the binary treatment; however to overcome the additional di±culty that we now are working in
22This discussion is heuristic in that it takes no account of the uncertainty of the estimated ¢LFS. A more
formal indicator would be obtained by considering the proportion of bootstrapped values of ¢LFS that fall
within the corresponding bootstrapped upper and lower bounds.
31a 5-dimensional space, we ¯x two dimensions, ¸22 and ¸21. Speci¯cally, we consider two rather
extreme but still plausible pro¯les: one of severe misclassi¯cation in these two dimensions
(¸22 = 0:90;¸21 = 0:05) and one of little misclassi¯cation (¸22 = 0:95;¸21 = 0:01).
In contrast to the binary case, one can visually appreciate from Figures 2-3 that the re-
striction in terms of over/under-reporting signi¯cantly increases identifying power. As can be
evinced from the graphs, the percentage gain is in fact larger in the case of little as opposed
to severe misclassi¯cation in terms of ¸22 and ¸21. For ¢¤
10 and ¢¤
20, the gain from the restric-
tion arises from `cropping' the top, i.e. lowering the upper bound; for ¢¤
21 , from raising the
lower bound instead. Comparing the three ATT's, the percentage reduction in bounds width is
largest for ¢¤
20 for either f¸22;¸21g pro¯le. The identi¯cation regions for the three parameters
under the restriction are in fact quite similar for the two pro¯les, and are roughly 10 to 15
percent for for ¢¤
10, 16 to 20 percent for ¢¤
21, and 29 to 30 percent for ¢¤
20. Indeed, under our
restriction, ¢¤
20 is very tightly bound under either pro¯le.
Next, we allow for heterogeneity in the two misclassi¯cation probabilities ¸00(x) and ¸11(x)
and investigate the identifying power of considering bounds that, whilst keeping the values of
f¸22;¸21g constant to those of either of the two pro¯les and meeting the over/under-reporting
restriction, further satisfy ¸00(x) + ¸11(x) ¸ k, for increasing values of k. The results are
reported in Table 3, together with the 95 percent con¯dence intervals for the identi¯cation
region, which as mentioned leads to conservative inference for the ATT of interest.
As expected, for given f¸22;¸21g pro¯le, the bounds monotonically narrow as ¸00(x)+¸11(x)
approaches 2. For ¢¤
10, bounds become more informative because of a lowering of the upper
bound, for ¢¤
21 because of a raising of the lower bound. For ¢¤
20, however, the bounds remain
unchanged for k = 1:6 and k = 1:7, and for higher levels of k both the lower and upper bounds
move closer. Interestingly, the result that bounds either stay the same or become narrower as
we get closer to exact reporting in terms of ¸00 and ¸11 no longer applies in terms of ¸22 and
¸21. Speci¯cally, bounds do not always become more informative when moving from severe to
little misclassi¯cation in terms of ¸22 and ¸21 (see k = 1:6 for ¢¤
10 and k = 1:6;1:7;1:8 for ¢¤
20).
As to how the `raw' incremental e®ects ¢ij's relate to the bounds, in contrast to the binary
case no clear pattern applies. In fact, although the ¢ij's are mostly downward biased, in
terms of point estimate, at times the estimated lower bound proves sharper than the raw
e®ect. Furthermore, the raw e®ects could at times be upward biased, even though in our
32application this could happen only for ¢¤
21 and, interestingly, only for a situation of more
severe misclassi¯cation in all dimensions (¸00, ¸11, ¸22 and ¸21).
Finally, we consider the relationship between the bounds for the true incremental ATT's
and the naive estimates based on the raw data and LFS-style controls. For the two sets of
values of f¸22;¸21g we have considered, ignoring misreporting and ability biases (¢LFS) yields
an upward biased estimate, in the sense that the ¢LFS's always lie well outside of the bounds.
Whatever the sum of ¸00 and ¸11, we thus ¯nd no evidence that there is a chance for the two
biases to cancel out. For ¢¤
20, this conclusion keeps holding in terms of the (conservative) CI
for the identi¯cation region - estimating returns to advanced quali¯cations compared to none
ignoring misclassi¯cation and selection yields severely upward biased estimates. For ¢¤
10, and
especially ¢¤
21, this conclusion is more likely to hold, as one would expect, in the case of less
severe misclassi¯cation (k = 1:8;1:9, and ¸00 = 0:95,¸21 = 0:01).
In contrast to the `traditional' binary treatment case, when account is taken of potential
misclassi¯cation across multiple treatments, the results in this section show that the patterns
that emerge can be exceptionally varied. However, the conclusion that in our application we
cannot expect measurement error to cancel out all ability bias keeps holding in our multiple-
treatment extension. More generally, our results show that under relatively mild restrictions we
can obtain strong conclusions regarding our question of interest, although more assumptions
are needed to obtain statistical signi¯cance.
9 Conclusions
In this paper we have looked at the bias introduced by misclassi¯cation of the treatment
indicator on the average treatment e®ect on the treated (ATT) under the assumption of selection
on observables. Matching-type estimators of the treatment e®ect computed from misclassi¯ed
data are in general biased for the true ATT. The true ATT can be over- or under-estimated
depending on the amount of misclassi¯cation. However, if misclassi¯cation does not depend on
variables entering the selection on observables assumption, or only depends on them via the
propensity score, the attenuation bias result is still most likely to hold.
We have extended the framework to multiple treatments.
We have provided results to bound the returns to a number of important educational qual-
i¯cations in the UK semi-parametrically, and by using the unique nature of our data we have
33assessed the plausibility for the two biases from measurement error and from omitted variables
cancel out.
In future work we plan to investigate the extent to which our discussion could be extended
to deal with the potentially interesting case in which some observables are known to a®ect only
the (mis)classi¯cation probabilities and not to enter the selection-on-observables assumption.
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38Table 1: Educational sample split (N=3,642)




No Acad 1,243 (34%)
Any Acad 2,399 (66%)
Below HE 2,472 (68%)
HE 1,170 (32%)
See main text for the de¯nition of the educational categories of interest.
Table 2: Bounds on returns from Any Academic Quali¯cation and from Higher Education
Any Acad Qual Higher Educ
¢¤ Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:6 0.2336 0.3975 0.1421 0.4890 0.2310 0.4032 0.1926 0.4416
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:7 0.2336 0.3340 0.1517 0.4159 0.2310 0.3378 0.1923 0.3765
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:8 0.2336 0.2947 0.1595 0.3688 0.2310 0.2956 0.1947 0.3319
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:9 0.2336 0.2607 0.1646 0.3297 0.2310 0.2597 0.1941 0.2966
Raw data:
Full controls: ¢ = 0:2336 ¢ = 0:2310
LFS controls: ¢LFS = 0:3286 ¢LFS = 0:3588
Bounds are derived from Proposition 2 by allowing the misclassi¯cation probabilities to depend on x through the
propensity score and by imposing that over-reporting is more likely than under-reporting. Con¯dence intervals
covering the identi¯cation region with 95 percent probability have been derived from 500 bootstrap replications
following Horowitz and Manski (2000).
39Table 3: Bounds on returns to incremental levels of attainment
¸22(x) = 0:95 and ¸21(x) = 0:01 ¸22(x) = 0:90 and ¸21(x) = 0:05
¢¤
10 Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:6 0.1057 0.1591 0.0331 0.2317 0.0981 0.1566 0.0249 0.2298
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:7 0.1057 0.1504 0.0352 0.2209 0.0981 0.1392 0.0261 0.2112
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:8 0.1057 0.1314 0.0358 0.2013 0.0981 0.1200 0.0285 0.1896
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:9 0.1057 0.1156 0.0361 0.1852 0.0981 0.1046 0.0285 0.1742
Raw data:
Full controls: ¢10 = 0:1060, LFS controls: ¢10;LFS = 0:1922
¸22(x) = 0:95 and ¸21(x) = 0:01 ¸22(x) = 0:90 and ¸21(x) = 0:05
¢¤
21 Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:6 0.1519 0.1944 0.0886 0.2577 0.1766 0.2159 0.1100 0.2825
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:7 0.1550 0.1944 0.0926 0.2568 0.1820 0.2159 0.1166 0.2813
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:8 0.1725 0.1944 0.1176 0.2493 0.1981 0.2159 0.1399 0.2741
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:9 0.1860 0.1944 0.1341 0.2463 0.2107 0.2159 0.1549 0.2717
Raw data:
Full controls: ¢21 = 0:1843, LFS controls: ¢21;LFS = 0:2432
¸22(x) = 0:95 and ¸21(x) = 0:01 ¸22(x) = 0:90 and ¸21(x) = 0:05
¢¤
20 Estimate 95% CI Estimate 95% CI
lower upper lower upper lower upper lower upper
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:6 0.2874 0.2944 0.1899 0.3919 0.2975 0.3104 0.2015 0.4064
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:7 0.2874 0.2944 0.1905 0.3913 0.2975 0.3104 0.2015 0.4064
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:8 0.2883 0.2944 0.1908 0.3919 0.2991 0.3076 0.2016 0.4051
¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¸ 1:9 0.2889 0.2917 0.1908 0.3898 0.3004 0.3029 0.2017 0.4016
Raw data:
Full controls: ¢20 = 0:2825, LFS controls: ¢20;LFS = 0:4339
See main text for the de¯nition of ¢¤
10, ¢¤
21 and ¢¤
20. Bounds are derived from Proposition 4 by allowing
the misclassi¯cation probabilities to depend on x through the propensity scores and by imposing that over-
reporting is more likely than under-reporting. Con¯dence intervals covering the identi¯cation region with 95
percent probability have been derived from 500 bootstrap replications following Horowitz and Manski (2000).
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¸1(x) ¡ 1 ¸0(x)
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¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1
:
The same result can be derived by noting that Assumption 3 implies
E(Y jD = 1;x) = E(Y jD
¤ = 0;x) + ¢
¤(x)¸1(x);
E(Y jD = 0;x) = E(Y jD
¤ = 0;x) + ¢
¤(x)¸10(x);
so that by taking the di®erence of the last two expressions
¢(x) = ¢
¤(x)[¸1(x) ¡ ¸10(x)];
so that the result follows since ¸10(x) = 1 ¡ ¸0(x).
Proof of Proposition 2
Using Bayes' theorem we get









where e(x) is the propensity score calculated from D. Since by the law of iterated expectations
we have
e
¤(x) = [1 ¡ ¸0(x)] + e(x)[¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1];
it also follows that
Pr(D






[1 ¡ ¸0(x)]f(x)dx +
Z
e(x)[¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1]f(x)dx:
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[¸0(x) + ¸1(x) ¡ 1]e(x)f(x)dx R
e(x)f(x)dx
:
Proof of Proposition 3
Conditioning on X = x is left implicit throughout. Start from
0
@
E[Y jD = 0]
E[Y jD = 1]





¸00 1 ¡ ¸00 0
1 ¡ ¸11 ¡ ¸21 ¸11 ¸21





E[Y jD¤ = 0]
E[Y jD¤ = 1]






E[Y jD¤ = 0]
E[Y jD¤ = 1]




det(¦) = ¸00(¸22 ¡ ¸21) ¡ ¸22(1 ¡ ¸11 ¡ ¸21) 6= 0:
42¢10 = E[Y jD
¤ = 0](1 ¡ ¸11 ¡ ¸21 ¡ ¸00)
+ E[Y jD




¤ = 0](1 ¡ ¸11 ¡ ¸21 ¡ ¸00)
+ E[Y jD
¤ = 0](¸11 + ¸00 ¡ 1)
+ ¢
¤










10(¸11 + ¸00 + ¸21 ¡ 1) + ¢
¤
21¸21;
where the last equality follows (under CIA) from ¢¤
20 = ¢¤
21 + ¢¤
10. By assuming ¢¤
10 ¸ 0 and
¢¤
21 ¸ 0, restrictions on the ¸'s can be de¯ned to avoid sign reversal. For example, a su±cient
condition for this is ¸11 + ¸00 ¸ 1.
¢21 = E[Y jD
¤ = 0](¡1 + ¸11 + ¸21)
+ E[Y jD
¤ = 1](1 ¡ ¸22 ¡ ¸11)
+ E[Y jD
¤ = 2](¸22 ¡ ¸21);
= E[Y jD
¤ = 0](¡1 + ¸11 + ¸21)
+ E[Y jD
¤ = 1](1 ¡ ¸22 ¡ ¸11)
+ E[Y jD






21(¸22 ¡ ¸21) + ¢
¤
10(1 ¡ ¸11 ¡ ¸21):
By assuming ¢¤
21 ¸ 0 and ¢¤
10 ¸ 0, a su±cient condition for not having sign reversal is
¸22 ¸ ¸21. It therefore follows that
¢20 = ¢21 + ¢10;
= ¢
¤

















¸00 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸11 ¡ ¸21) ¸21









¸00 ¡ (1 ¡ ¸11 ¡ ¸21) ¸21


























¸11 + ¸21 ¡ 1
det
¢10 +
¸00 + ¸11 + ¸21 ¡ 1
det
¢21:
Proof of Proposition 4











































Computation of f[xjD¤ = 1]
By using the adding up condition P[D = 0jx] = 1 ¡ P[D = 1jx] ¡ P[D = 2jx] we can write
P[D
¤ = 1jx] = (1 ¡ ¸00)P[D = 0jx] + ¸11P[D = 1jx] + (1 ¡ ¸22)P[D = 2jx];
= (1 ¡ ¸00) + (¸00 + ¸11 ¡ 1)P[D = 1jx] + (¸00 ¡ ¸22)P[D = 2jx];
so that
f[xjD
¤ = 1] = (1 ¡ ¸00)
f[x]
P[D¤ = 1]








44The following two expressions follow. First, we have
f[xjD

























+ (¸00 + ¸11 ¡ 1) +































(¸00 + ¸11 ¡ 1)P[D = 1jx]
P[D = 2jx]
+ (¸00 ¡ ¸22)]:
Computation of f[xjD¤ = 2]
By using
P[D
¤ = 2jx] = ¸21P[D = 1jx] + ¸22P[D = 2jx];
we have
f[xjD
¤ = 2] = ¸21
P[D = 1]
P[D¤ = 2]









































































P[D = 1](¸22 ¡ ¸21)(¸11 + ¸00 ¡ 1 +
P[D=2jx](¸00¡¸22)+1¡¸00
P[D=1jx] )
det(1 ¡ ¸00 + (¸11 + ¸00 ¡ 1)P[D = 1] + (¸00 ¡ ¸22)P[D = 2])
;






P[D = 2]¸21(¸00 ¡ ¸22 +
P[D=1jx](¸00+¸11¡1)+1¡¸00
P[D=2jx] )
det(1 ¡ ¸00 + (¸11 + ¸00 ¡ 1)P[D = 1] + (¸00 ¡ ¸22)P[D = 2])
;
where the last expression follows under misclassi¯cation constant with respect to X. In what
follows, we report similar expressions for ¢¤
21 and ¢¤
20, where weights are derived with and













¸11 + ¸21 ¡ 1
det
¢10[x]f[xjD
¤ = 2]dx +
Z














P[D = 1](¸11 + ¸21 ¡ 1)(¸21 + ¸22
P[D=2jx]
P[D=1jx])
det(¸21P[D = 1] + ¸22P[D = 2])
;
!2;21(x) =




P[D = 2](¸00 + ¸11 + ¸21 ¡ 1)(¸22 + ¸21
P[D=1jx]
P[D=2jx])





































P[D = 1](¸11 + ¸22 ¡ 1)(¸21 + ¸22
P[D=2jx]
P[D=1jx])
det(¸21P[D = 1] + ¸22P[D = 2])
;
!2;20(x) =




P[D = 2](¸00 + ¸11 ¡ 1)(¸22 + ¸21
P[D=1jx]
P[D=2jx])
det(¸21P[D = 1] + ¸22P[D = 2])
:
47Figure 1: Identi¯cation region for the return to any academic quali¯cation, assuming constant














































48Figure 2: Identi¯cation region for returns to incremental levels of attainment, assuming constant
misclassi¯cation probabilities and by imposing ¸22 = 0:90 and ¸21 = 0:05; the assumption that

















































































































































49Figure 3: Identi¯cation region for returns to incremental levels of attainment, assuming constant
misclassi¯cation probabilities and by imposing ¸22 = 0:95 and ¸21 = 0:01; the assumption that
overreporting is more likely than underreporting is superimposed in the right-hand-side panels
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